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Introduction
The government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia signed a protocol
on accession of Yugoslavia to the Third Pact – that is, on joining
the Nazi and Fascist axis - on March 25, 1941. As soon as the
protocol was signed, the Communist Party called the people to
action, and from March 25-27, mass demonstrations under the
slogans »Bolje rat  nego pakt« (better war than the pact) and
»Bolje grob nego rob« (better the grave than a slave) took place
throughout the country. Outraged, Hitler ordered his generals to
attack immediately and dismember Yugoslavia. On April 6, 1941,
without a prior declaration of war, the German, Italian,
Hungarian, and Bulgarian forces invaded Yugoslavia and defeat-
ed the Yugoslav Army in twelve days. On April 17, 1941, Yugoslav
General Radoje Jankoviè and the former Foreign Minister, Cincar
Markoviæ, signed an act of unconditional  surrender which took
force at noon the following day, April 18.  The  epilogue:
Yugoslavia vanished in a matter of days:  the Germans, Italians,
Bulgarian and Hungarians had virtually dismembered it.1
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1. The Germans and the Italians took about 340,000 Yugoslav soldiers and officers
war prisoners. Italy annexed parts of Slovenia (by King’s order of  May 3, 1941, the
Italians proclaimed the so-called  »Province of Ljubljana« a constitutive part of the
Italian Kingdom Italy had gotten the northern and the  southern littoral part of
Slovenia soon after the 15` WW). Italy also occupied parts of the Croatian coast
and Dalmatia, and other parts of Croatia, B-H and Montenegro. Germany
annexed  parts of Slovenia and the rest of Croatia, B-H, and most of Serbia, where-
as Banat was under direct  German administration. The Hungarians annexed
Prekmurje, Baranja, and Baèka and occupied  Medjimurje.  Kosovo and Metohija
were annexed to Albania. The rest was  occupied, i.e. annexed to Bulgaria.
On April 27, 1941, a popular political  movement, the
Liberation Front (OF), was established on the initiative of the
Communist Party of Slovenia, with the task of organizing a strug-
gle against the occupier.  The OF was established by four politi-
cal groups: the Communist Party of Slovenia, the Christian
Democrats, the Slovene Sokol (Hawk) Association, and the cultur-
al workers.  In autumn of 1941, they were joined by several small-
er political groups. The highest OF authority was the Supreme
Plenum (constituted on June 15, 1941) which on Sept.16, 1941,
proclaimed itself  the Slovene National Liberation Committee
(SNOO). From June until the end of 1941, the OF drafted its
national liberation program and announced it would take power
once the war was over and  install a people’s democracy in
Slovenia. After the capitulation of Italy, they called for assembly
elections of the Slovene nation in Koèevje (October 1-10, 1943)
and  elected the OF 120-member plenum and the ten-member
Executive Committee, which represented both the SNOO and thei
SNOO Presidency, merging into the political and the administrai i i li i l i i -
tive authorityi i . The foundations of Slovene  statehood were laid
between February 19-20, 1944 in Èrnomelj with the election of
the  Slovene National Liberation Council (SNOS) as the highest
Slovenian representative body and the SNOS Presidency as the
National Committee of Liberation of Slovenia  (NKOS), which
assumed the functions of the government and formed the com-
missariats, commissions, and other state bodies. On May 5,
1945, the SNOS issued  the Act on National Government, which
was presented in Ljubljana on May 10, 1945.
Thus the OF, which initially had only political connotations,
expanded quickly into an administrative authority in order toi i
enable it to adopt normative acts of  authoritative nature,l i i i i serving
as the basis for the activity of its other bodies.
Since we intend here only to discuss the origins and develop-
ment of the intelligence and security bodies in Slovenia, we will
not address other areas of OF activity or the development of state
bodies. 
Establishment of NZ (National Protection)
Immediately after its establishment, the OF answered the call of
the Central  Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia (CK
KPS)2 by issuing a special  directive about national protection and
called for the  establishment of Village Guards and National
Protection in towns and boroughs. Given the political significance
2. In April 1941, the CK KPS issued a special call to the Slovene people to unite in the
struggle  against the imperialist occupier. The call was directed also to »soldiers and
low and high-ranking  officers of the German, Italian, and Hungarian occupying
armies«.62
of the National Guards, the OF  supreme plenum, after having
changed into the SNOO, issued a decree on the protection of the
Slovene nation, its liberation movement, and unification, which
provided a legal and factual basis for the sanctioning authority. At
the same  time, the OF leadership issued a resolution on the
establishment of the National Protection. The first organizers of
National Protection were the party’s military desk  officers,  and it
got into full swing during the winter of  1941-42, developing most
quickly in the area around Ljubljana. It was established to serve as
the armed defender of the Slovene nation against the aggression
of the occupier, with the task of impeding  arrests, requisitions,
and deportations of the Slovenes, colonization of foreigners,
burning of villages, and other acts of violence.3
Establishment of VOS (Security and Intelligence Service)
In addition to the National Protection, the Security Intelligence
Service (VOS)  was established, at the Initiative and under the
explicit  patronage of the CK KPS.  It was given special powers in
the struggle against the fifth column, traitors, and enemy intelli-
gence services.  It also collected information about the move-
ments and activities of occupying troops and traitors. The VOS
was comprised of the most  trusted members of the KPS.
VOS activities are best described by a passage from a letter
(29 March 29, 1942) by a  member of the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee of the  Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Edvard
Kardelj, to the General Secretary, Josip Broz Tito: “The whole
machinery actually consists of party members and our people will
not let it go nor permit its being controlled. It is comprised of two
parts: the intelligence service and the executive apparatus. The
leadership is united, and consists of secretaries of the two parties
and the head of the service, who is directly tied to the CK. The
amount of intelligence work is immense, and numerous reports
arrive daily to district intelligence stations. They even have a tidy
file about  people they watch, follow, etc. They have »agents
provocateurs« in the White Guards organizations, etc. Thanks to
this really unique apparatus they are extremely well-informed
about everything and have already foiled attempts to infiltrate
provocateurs into the KP and OF.  This apparatus functions much
better than the OVRA or GESTAPO in Ljubljana. They have
already collected precious military information (Italian and
German airfields, ammunition depots, fortifications), although itl i
3. The tasks of the original National Protection were later (from March 1, 1944
onwards) performed by  the Army of National Security (VDV) as predecessor of the
Corps of National Liberation of Yugoslavia  (KNOJ). On March 1, 1944, the
National Security was newly organized and given the task of protecting the popu-
lation and its property against criminal elements and protecting the public order.
This  National Protection was the predecessor of the people’s militia.63
was Gaš that has fallen with them, which is what lies most heavyll i i i li
on him.i The execution unit consists of approximately fifty men,
armed with revolvers and hand grenades and well-trained. They
have started now to increase their number due to the increasing
Italian terror and the White Guards actions.4 These boys do all
kinds of things. Let me cite a few examples: informers and occu-
pier’s servants are falling almost dailylli l il , etc. Police protection is not
sufficient for those who are targeted by the VOS people. They
come to a restaurant with revolvers, tell the people there to raise
their hands in order to identify them if they are looking for some-
body; arrest people on the streets, whisk them away and interro-
gate them (the arrested dare not call the Italians for help, because
the OF issued a decree stating that anybody who turns to the
occupier for help will be shot immediately), search the White
Guards houses, ransack and burn the White Guards supplies,
interrogate Gestapo members during the night ( in the center of
Ljubljana), etc. For instance, they raided the illegal printing press
of Draža’s people, and seized the printing machine and charac-
ters they are using to print the OF material, and 130 kilograms of
paper. They interrogated three »printers« who admitted everything,
then they burned everything they had printed, loaded the materi-
al into the car, and drove off. This is also how they apprehended
some White Guards couriers who were carrying leaflets against
us; they seized the leaflets and beat the couriers. Similar actions
are being taken by the National Protection, although they are
more of a military nature. The »security service« is feared like hell,
but it is precisely this service and the National Protection and par-
tisans - the OF - which give the authority its real power.... The
security service has become so famous that nobody they target
can escape…the Italian police has been pretty helpless, consider-
ing that the VOS people enjoys great support from the people,
and the traitors are afraid to show themselves.”
The VOS functioned as a specialized organization focused on
collecting information from the OF through field committees in
which “particularly trustworthy comrades were in charge of organ-
izing the massive intelligence service.” All information on »sus-
pects collaborating in the conspiracy against the nation« and on
»all Slovenes who collaborated with the Germans, Italians and
anti-national conspirators and the fifth column«5 was collected
there.
4. The White Guards were composed of Slovenes associated with the Slovene
Covenant. The Italians  armed it and used it to fight the partisan troops, proclaim-
ing it on March 1, 1943 the Milizia  volontaria anticomunista (MVAC-volunteer
anti-communist militia). The partisan units defeated it at the castle of Turjak in
September 1943.
5. From the article by Boris Kidriè, “The Fight against the Fifth Column! Let’s build up
the intelligence  service.” The Slovene Reporter, 5 Dec. 1941.64
From 1941-42, the VOS was active in Ljubljana and Novo
Mesto. In other areas, it was still in its early stages.
Establishment of the Military Intelligence Service
Due to the need for intelligence and information on the move-
ments, strength, and activity of the occupiers, the Main Command
of the Slovene partisan troops was formed late in 1941, and in
1942, a body of three members who were to establish the military
intelligence service to serve the needs of the NOV (National
Liberation Army) and the PO of Slovenia. Initially, the military intel-
ligence service was to be organized independently, but experience
showed that it would be best to organize it the same way as the
civil intelligence service. Intelligence centers collecting information
and data from the Party and OF organizations were established
within the operative units. The area of activity included »all infor-
mation of relevance for the Headquarters.”
In order to expand intelligence activities throughout Slovenia,
the CK KPS ordered the immediate formation of the KPS Provincial
Committee for the Littoral so that it could “spread its network as
soon as possible in Trieste, where extremely important information
was to be had.”6
At the same time, on November 27, 1942, the Supreme
Commander of the NOV and PO of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito,
gave a special order to the General Staff of the NOV and PO of
Slovenia to start organizing intelligence services in the Slovene
Army. The order specifies the establishment, within the GS, of a
central intelligence center for Slovenia, with four auxiliary intelli-
gence centers (for Upper, Continental, Lower Carniola, and
Ljubljana). The auxiliary intelligence centers would be divided into
districts and then into municipal or village commissariats. The
division, brigade, and battalion centers would be set up in the
operative units, whereas commissariats would be established at
the company level or lower. The intelligence center would be set
up within the area command on the liberated territory and within
the town command in the town center, the latter in charge of
organizing and expanding the intelligence service within the vil-
lage national liberation committees, functioning through their
commissars. The order also ordered special “intelligence reports
to be made every seven days” to meet the needs of the Supreme
Staff.
A reply arrived from Edvard Kardelj on Jan 17, 1943, by
order of the Supreme Commander: :”We got your orders, but our
6. The directive of the CK KPS of 20 Sept. 1942 for the KP KPS for the Littoral, the
archive of the CK ZKS in Ljubljana. The request to establish an intelligence service
in Trieste (Italy) was sent to the Party’s leadership by the COMINTERN, which
released the information to the Soviet Union.65
intelligence service has been structured somewhat differently up to
now, which is why we kindly ask that you give us an answer
regarding this question. Within the CK KPS, we have had the
»Intelligence and Security Service Center«, which is in the process
of merging the two branches of intelligence: military and civil. The
military is organized according to the system you propose, and the
civil according to the party’s organizational network. It has its
people in the OF organizations and elsewhere. The »special sec-
tors« (occupying army, White Guards, Mihajloviæ’s men, the
police, etc.) refer to the Center. This center sent its agents out, and
Angelo (Ivan Maèek Matija) will tell you more about that. I hope
we will soon get results there which will also be important for you.
We have done this at the request of the Director (it has a secret
for the Comintern Intelligence Center) and we have directly con-
nected our center through Stevo (Ivan Krejaèiè). We achieved suc-
cess in Ljubljana, but the apparatus doesn’t yet exist in the field.
We are going to finish building it up in both branches, according
to your instructions. I think it would be the best if things stayed the
way they are, especially because of the OF. This is precisely why
we transferred this network - along with the army - directly to the
Party. Our center will keep sending you reports. Angelo is going
to bring two reports. Neither will be of interest to you, although
there are some passages you should read (the issue of Italy, 2nd
front, and the presence of the Bulgarian Army in Italy). Apart from
the sectors you propose, we have set up also the intelligence serv-
ice for the Littoral and Trieste (the Gorica Center). You will surely
be in agreement with this. As regards the rest, we will follow your
orders. Let us know if you agree with such a system. Let me reiter-
ate: the intelligence center of the CK KPS here is above the intel-
ligence center of the General Staff, and merges army intelligence
(according to your system) with the civil (which you do not men-
tion).”
Building on and Enlarging VOS
The order of the Supreme Commander of the NOV and PO of
Yugoslavia and the realization that the existing methods of the
VOS in Slovenia did not meet requirements induced the CK KPS
to prescribe special »Instructions for Building Up the Intelligence
Service in the Field and in the Army«.7 The instructions called for
the completion of two tasks within the VOS organization:
a) the VOS must be perfected to support through its intelligence
activity the military and political struggle against the occupier.
It is not meant to penetrate espionage, but should become
»the action weapon of the liberation struggle for the destruc-
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7. The original document is in the archive of the Institute of the History of the Labor
Movement in Ljubljana
tion of the enemy on its own positions by special methods
intrinsic to the nature of the VOS«;
b) the VOS must become a strong weapon which will deter all
attempts of the enemies of the Slovene nation to impose
national or any other kind of repression«. The instruction
describes the VOS as a popular liberation movement guided
by the people’s democratic rule, and it is to carry out all the
tasks assigned by the OF. As such, the VOS is therefore »the
most vulnerable sector of the liberation battle and only the
highest KP leadership can be involved in its activities«.... This
means that the appropriate Party organizations must directly
supervise and conduct VOS activities in the interest of the
entire OF«. The instruction states that the intelligence and
security service, in the field and the army, will be led by the
VOS Central Committee, which is directly accountable to the
CK KPS and CK KPJ and to whom both report. The VOS cen-
tral commission supervised and controlled two autonomous
areas:
The VOS field sector (overseen by the VOS Central Commission) 
The NOV and PO intelligence sector (led by the Main Intelligence
Sector within the Main Command of the SNOV and PO)
which was composed of the intelligence and counter-espi-
onage center.
The military intelligence service was formed after the capitula-
tion of Italy and the liberation of vast territories, as they requested
continual defense. The NOV and PO General Staff of Slovenia
therefore issued the “Decree on Setting Up a VOS Battalion”8 to
secure Koèevski Rog. Other »special VOS detachments to oppose
the fifth column, espionage, treason and other enemy actions
were established in the rear under direct command of the General
Staff, though they actually represented the well-armed VOS exec-
utive.«
Abolishment of VOS and Establishment of the Internal Affairs
Section (NZ Section)
The Slovene concept of intelligence and security, therefore, devel-
oped under specific circumstances; namely, during the building of
Slovene statehood. The peculiarities which can be observed espe-
cially in distinguishing the political organization from the organi-
zation of state bodies and in the independent development of the
highest Slovene state bodies, expressed themselves fully after the
OF session in Crnomelj when the SNOO was transformed into the
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8. From the archive of the Institute of History of Labor Movement in Ljubljana.
SNOS. The separation of the political organization from the state
body was dictated by time, since the responsible people were then
expecting that the war would be over by the fall of 1944. Namely,
upon liberation it was urgently necessary to present themselves at
home and to the world with as prefect as possible organization of
all authority bodies. During preparations for the session in
Crnomelj, the OF executive committee, which was also acting as
the SNOO Presidency (February 1944), proposed a re-organized
SNOS Presidency, along with the others9, and a section for inter-
nal affairs to which all security-intelligence services would submit.
That Act disempowered the VOS as a special agency with special
authorization and powers. The SNOS adopted three decrees in
March 1944, by which internal affairs were regulated: the estab-
lishment of district stations of internal affairs sections; assigning
armed forces to the internal affairs section; and the introduction
and organization of the National Protection. The district stations
merged intelligence and National Protection divisions. Intelligence
officers of the disbanded OF VOS went to the intelligence division,
while former security officials and guards comprised the new,
armed formation, the Army of State Security (VDV).
The armed forces VDV was assigned to the internal affairs sec-
tion, but it was also part of the National Liberation Army of
Slovenia. The first organizational structure of the internal affairs
section was also created in March 1944. It was composed of four
divisions: National Protection Division, Intelligence and Records
Division, Division of the VDV Command, and Foreign Entities. This
structure remained unchanged throughout the activity of the sec-
tion and until the establishment of the National Protection
Department (OZNA).
The internal affairs section composed the so-called BASE 24.
By establishing the internal affairs section within the NOS
presidency, the NOV and POS completed the organization of the
intelligence service in the army and established the intelligence
division which had a sections in the army, in the field, and abroad.
The division also contained a section for education, communica-
tions, administration, and intelligence officers.
Establishment of OZNA
Organization of the intelligence services continued until August
1944, when the President of the National Committee of Liberation
of Yugoslavia (NKOJ)10, Josip Broz Tito, issued (May 13, 1944) the
68
9. Other sections established in addition to the internal affairs were: section for build-
ing national authority, education, economy, finance, reconstruction, health, and
information and propaganda.
10. NKOJ was the executive body of the AVNOJ and held the role of the first people’s
government during NOB.
Directive on Organizational Structure of the National Protection
Department (OZNA). This directive prescribed the system of reor-
ganization of the intelligence and security system of the national
liberation movement in Yugoslavia. Edvard Kardelj was the first to
inform the Slovene political players of the preparations to estab-
lish OZNA as an all-Yugoslav organization ( May 5, 1944).11 He
wrote that the Yugoslavian party leadership had decided to resolve
the question of the fifth column in a different way than had been
done in Slovenia. This sector would be removed from the internal
affairs commissariat and be subordinated to the national defense
commissariat, remaining within the military organizations. Kardelj
wrote further that there would be only two divisions left in the inte-
rior commissariat: the administrative and the militia. He pointed
out that the term militia was introduced in Slovenia to avoid con-
fusing it with the newly established section opposing the fifth col-
umn, the OZNA12.
Until OZNA was established, intelligence and security tasks
were carried out by several organizations. In spring,1944, the
tasks were carried out by the Section for Protection of Nations in
central and western Bosnia, part of Croatia, and Vojvodina; cen-
ters of territorial intelligence in Croatian Vojvodina and
Montenegro; intelligence division of the Internal Affairs Section
within the SNOS Presidency in Slovenia; and intelligence service
of partisan detachments in Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosovo.  The
reorganization of intelligence and security could not satisfy the
growing needs of the Supreme Staff. OZNA was created as
autonomous, military organization whose unitary structure and
centralized leadership were to ensure a tough political line in the
intelligence and counter-intelligence services. All OZNA tasks
were divided into four groups, each comprising an organization-
al unit. 
The first section (intelligence) organized intelligence activity in
other countries, enemy state institutions, and occupied territory. It
recruited agents and sent them to work outside the borders of the
liberated territory. It collected intelligence on enemy agent net-
works, police, quisling state machinery, and quisling military units.
This was essentially an offensive intelligence service, directed
against foreign countries and occupied territory.
The second section (counterintelligence service in the liberat-
ed territory) collected information from trusted informers on polit-
ical groups which had either joined the national liberation move-
ment or stayed outside it, on enemy agent activities, and on
armed groups of national traitors and fifth columnists.
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11. In a letter to Luka Krištof- archive of the CK ZKS in Ljubljana.
12. Owing to reluctance to use the term »militia«, the name of National Protection was
used in Slovenia until the war was over, in spite of the existence OZNA.
The third section organized counter-intelligence protection of
armed forces and was active only in the NOV and PO.
The fourth section performed statistical and technical tasks,
processed information, and kept records. This section also includ-
ed special photography, secret writing, radio centers, and
decoders.
A fifth and sixth section were formed in OZNA in March and
April,1945.
The fifth section was formed as a counterintelligence service
against foreign agent networks in Yugoslavia; that is, foreign intel-
ligence services. (In 1946, this section merged with the new third
section, which was created after the military counterintelligence
service became independent).
The sixth section performed tasks dealing with counter-intelli-
gence protection of transportation, but was absorbed soon after
its establishment by the second sector.
When the National Liberation Army changed its name into the
Yugoslav Army on  March 1, 1945, the OZNA of Democratic
Federal Yugoslavia proclaimed by special directive ( March
24,1945) a new organization of the Yugoslav Army – OZNA.
OZNA was in direct command of counter-intelligence protection
of military command posts, institutions, and units. Sections were
set up within independent corps. In this way, the OZNA section for
the authority of the 7th Corps in Slovenia was subordinated to the
third section of OZNA for Slovenia. This third OZNA section was
in force until the end of July, 1945, when the »military« and »civil«
part of OZNA began to separate and finally split in March, 1946.
At that time, the Administrative Directorate for Security of Yugoslav
Army was formed from the »military part« and the Administrative
State Security Directorate from the »civil part.
Since OZNA was actually left without its third section after the
military counterintelligence service became independent, it
formed a new third section unconnected to the previous one. It
focused initially on reconstruction and operations of the German
intelligence service (especially GESTAPO). Later, the third section
assumed operations for all foreign intelligence services, borders,
and traffic of foreigners (which were essentially the tasks of the fifth
section).
After the establishment of the Corps of National Defense of
Yugoslavia (KNOJ) on August 15, 1944, the VDV units merged
with it. The first was the Slovene Division of National Defense.
KNOJ was established as the armed military formation which took
over the task of protecting liberated territory and the NOV hinter-
land. KNOJ was subordinated to the OZNA directorate.
Directly tied to the first OZNA section for Slovenia were the
intelligence organizations in Ljubljana and Trieste, which, due to
special circumstances, did not reorganize according to OZNA70
instructions, but followed the principles of the OF VOS. The first
OZNA section for Slovenia was given the special task of monitor-
ing the situation in Istra and northern Italy because of the expect-
ed disembarkation of Anglo-American troops. A special line for
Austria and Germany, operating in Styria, was formed in the
OZNA section to collect military information on the approaching
front, and the activities of German intelligence services in Styria.
A special »CC« line was also formed in the second section to
collect information on fellow partisan combatants. Gradually it
was transformed and focused exclusively on the so-called »inter-
nal enemy”.
The third section directed the surveillance of British, American,
and Czech missions at the Slovene GS and at staffs of Zone
Corps. It also monitored paratroopers who came to the NOV
from the English intelligence service.
The fourth section continued filing information they had been
collected within the OF VOS since 1941. From initial information
files on 4,000 people, by the end of the war the number had
increased to 17,750.
OZNA was led by a chief13 who was directly subordinate to
the Supreme Commander.
Redesignation to UDV 
In spring 1945, OZNA was focused on the approaching military
defeat of the occupying forces, so in March, 1045, the OZNA
leadership started transferring tasks and cadres to posts they
would occupy when the partisan troops marched into liberated
Slovene towns. Every OZNA member knew before the liberation
where he would go and what duties he would assume. It immedi-
ately occupied the headquarters of the enemy’s intelligence and
police organizations, seized and secured the archives, and started
arresting enemy agents and hostile elements. Simultaneously, they
started working under new structures appropriate for the post-war
period. After its arrival in Ljubljana, the OZNA occupied the prem-
ises of the former bank SLAVIJA and started consolidating the
organization throughout Slovenia, particularly in Ljubljana,
Maribor, Celje, Novo mesto, Trieste, and Gorica. After withdraw-
al of the Yugoslav army from Trieste and zone A (on 12 June
1945), a new OZNA was organized for the eastern littoral district,
with headquarters in Ajdovšèina.
OZNA and the State Security Directorate (UDV) underwent
after 1946 many security and intelligence changes due to topical
issues at that time: fighting gangs; protection of the economy;
Cominform; and bureaucratic aspirations)
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13. Aleksander Rankoviè was appointed Chief of OZNA.
In 1945 and 1946, for instance, the UDV was organized into
districts, and in 1947 (when the territory of the People’s Republic
of Slovenia was divided into counties and localities) into towns,
districts, and localities. In 1950, when the administrative-territori-
al units were abolished as authorities (see the Act on abolishment
of authority, LRS Off. Gazette no. 4/51), the UDV reorganized
again.
The intelligence and security activities focussed during this
period less on intelligence and more on security issues. There was
an emphasis on collectivism, equality, brotherhood, social har-
mony, long term prospects, loyalty, and tolerance towards those
with different views. Deviation from this set of values became an
immediately issue for security services.
Later, the use of force was mitigated and when the process of
»decentralization of people’s power« began, intelligence and
security services underwent further reorganization in order to
deconcentrate power and increase effectiveness. The Act on
Internal Affairs (FLRJ Off. Gaz. No. 30/56) and the Decree on
Organization of State Internal Affairs Secretariat (SRS Off. Gaz.
No. 10/59) regulated the intelligence security authority in
Slovenia as the prerogative of the State Security Directorate with-
in the Ministry of the Interior. The next reorganization addressed
issues within the competence of the federation (state security,
cross-border traffic, foreign citizens, passports, introduction and
dissemination of foreign press, and federal citizenship).
From 1963 - 74, security intelligence services dealt with a
series of domestic and foreign political events. At home, there
were political confrontation both before and after the Brioni
Plenum (1966), liberal flareups and massive demonstrations in
Belgrade (1969), »MASPOK« (mass movement) in Croatia (1971),
an incursion of a group of nationalists (Raduša, 1972), and a
revival of national awareness in Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, and
Slovenia. The most significant event abroad was the invasion of
the Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia (1968).
These were the circumstances at the time the first act on inter-
nal affairs of the Republic of Slovenia was adopted in 1967(SRS
Off. Gaz. No. 13/67). According to this act, internal affairs were
handled directly by the municipal administrative bodies and the
republic secretariat of internal affairs or by their provincial bodies.
This was the first time after 1945 that Slovenia gained control and
greater influence over its security organs and intelligence security
service. The State Security Service (SDV) was defined by law as a
professional service within the republic secretariat of internal
affairs (RSNZ). Naturally, most of its competence remained within
federal institutions, as prescribed by the Act on Handling Internal
Affairs Under Competence of Federal Administrative Bodies
(1971), which determined that the federal secretariat of internal72
affairs coordinate the work of the SDV in the republics and
provinces. Further steps were taken with the transformation of
state administration, adoption of the federal act on state adminis-
tration (1978), and the republic act (1978). The newly adopted
act on internal affairs tasked the Republic Secretariat of Internal
Affairs (RSNZ) with state security issues, which then became RSNZ
issues and were no longer given special handling »at the RSNZ«.
This resolution remained in force until the 1991 modifications of
the act on internal affairs.
Intelligence and security activity was organized in the following
manner: 
- After OZNA was abolished, intelligence activity was divided
among various federal ministries: the Federal Ministry of the
Interior by the State Security Directorate, i.e. Service14; and the
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Service of
Investigation and Documentation (SID), which collected for-
eign political information; military-defense intelligence was
handled by the GS 2nd Department.
- The Slovene SDV was not autonomous, but was tied to the fed-
eral service which co-ordinated the work and issued instruc-
tions.
- State security was regulated by secret legislation (secret Official
Gazette), which prescribed the use of special operations. The
SDV performed house searches, covert interceptions inside
the premises, telecommunications interception, covert surveil-
lance of people, and covert interception of letters and other
consignments. 
- Of primary interest to the SDV was the domestic - identifying and
obstructing activities of the »domestic enemy« (i.e. the “bour-
geois rightwing”, clericalists, members of the Cominform,
nationalists, and separatists). Intelligence work abroad was
deemed less important and was under federal control. It is
interesting to note that an independent intelligence directorate
was not established until 1991.
- The SDV was a “political police”, answerable to the party organ-
ization from which it received its guidelines and to which it
reported. The SDV was so deeply rooted in the political sys-
tem that one of its tasks was the preparation of »Political
Security Assessments«; that is, assessments on literally all
spheres of life.
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14. The denomination of the service changed depending on the environment: the state
security affairs were first handled by the so-called State Security Directorate; after
1966 by the State Security Service, and after 1991, again by the Directorate of State
Security Service.
- During its activity, the SDV enjoyed a wide range of power,
including classical police powers (identifications, interroga-
tions, and arrests).
- The SDV organization was constantly changing and making
improvements, but it remained tied to the central unit in
Ljubljana and smaller working groups in the field. All infor-
mation and data flowed into the central unit in Ljubljana and
sent on from there to the users. Field groups had working con-
tacts with the local authorities, but did not answer to them.
The role of Slovene intelligence and security changed after
1986, when a different mentality reigned within the Party and the
processes of democratization were initiated. The situation was dif-
ferent in other parts of the former Yugoslavia.
Intelligence security activities began to come under attack,
and people started writing about and criticizing the SDV. There
were no more taboo subjects. The party organization was abol-
ished in the SDV and the first attempts to introduce political, i.e.
parliamentary, control began.
The Slovene SDV also had the role of protecting the Slovene
political authorities and at the same time had to exist within the
multi-national Yugoslav community. The Slovene party and higher
administration were the primary consumers of information by the
republic SDV, which explains why the SDV came into conflict with
the federal bodies. The conflict between federal and republic
interests forced the republic bodies to make more decisions to
protect the constitutional order, which had been thus far sacro-
sanct. In 1985 the Presidency of SR of Slovenia adopted a reso-
lution banning the SDV from acting against the republic’s political
authorities (that is, against the President and members of the SRS
Presidency, CK ZKS Presidency, assembly spokesman, executive
council, presidents of the RK SZDL, RS ZSS, TO ZZB NOV and
president of the RK ZSMS). The council for the protection of the
constitutional order expanded the resolution and extended pro-
tection from the SDV to the entire leadership when it ordered that
the Republic Secretary of Internal Affairs was required to gain the
consensus of the Council for activities against presidents and
members of the presidencies of the social-political organizations
in the Republic (SZDL, ZSS, ZZB, ZSMS); vice presidents of the SRS
Assembly; union trade presidents; vice presidents and members of
the SSRS Executive Council; members of the Republic Council;
president of the SRS Constitutional Court; president of the SRS
Court of United Labor; SRS public prosecutor; SRS social custodi-
an of self management; SRS public custodian; and president of
the SRS Commercial Chamber.
The republic leadership thus protected itself against the inter-
vention of the SDV which by then was no longer ideologically uni-74
fied owing to changes in personnel and multinational and hetero-
geneous cadres. This was the first time the political and Party
leadership of Slovenia had expressed its distrust towards the SDV.
Soon after, changes and supplements to the Act on National
Protection (RS Off. Gazette 38/88) were introduced. This law
determined that »the RS Assembly, through a special body, exer-
cises control over SDV work«. The appointment of a commission
to monitor the work was one of the most absurd decisions made
in intelligence security during the era of »social democracy”, since
SDV activity was regulated by federal legislation and regulations
published in the secret Official Gazettes. Neither the commission
members nor its president had access to these Acts. It was difficult
to evaluate information, since the commission had no investiga-
tive powers or capability to verify information. The head of the
service was tasked simply to deliver requested information, even
classified, to the commission. The SDV was also still receiving asks
from the Party, although the supervising commission lacked the
powers to control those tasks. In the same year (October, 1988),
the Council for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms was established. The above-mentioned events under-
mined the unity of the SDV in SRS, which formulated its own,
unpublished regulations (sub-legal acts, ordinances, etc.). This
made any protest about violation of rights impossible, as the reg-
ulations were inaccessible to the public. 
Establishment of Intelligence Section Within SDV Directorate
In the late 1980s, a peculiarity unknown in other parts of
Yugoslavia came into existence in Slovenia. Due to an increase in
democratization and more »humane« points of view, the term
“bourgeois right” was substituted for »internal enemy« in Slovene
intelligence and security practices. “Internal enemies« had been
clearly defined in the penal code and required a legal response
and punishment, whereas the term »bourgeois right« did not
require sanctions, though it was unacceptable to the Party. The RS
SDV could therefore act against the »bourgeois right-wing« but
were not required to prosecute them. The Slovene political author-
ities took an intermediate path which was less punitive than the
federal but nevertheless provided it with knowledge about the
growing opposition. Due to increasing criticism and the process-
es of democratization, the work of the SDV was reduced. In order
harmonize the legal status of the SDV with the current develop-
ments, the RS SDV leadership prepared (March, 1989) a
Directorate of State Security Service law and set up within the SDV
a section for protection against the activities of foreign intelligence
services; a section to fight international terrorism; a section to pro-
tect against the violent overthrow of constitutional order; a section75
to protect individuals, facilities, and specific areas; and an intelli-
gence section. This was the first time since the abolition of the
VOS that a shift was made from classical security to intelligence
security. A large part of SDV operations was re-directed into intel-
ligence collection .
Conflict with Federal Authorities
The first democratic multiparty elections in April 1990, which
enhanced the process of democratization and led to a plebiscite
in December 1990, reverberated within the Federal Secretariat of
Internal Affairs (ZSNZ) and Federal State Security Directorate
(ZSDV), which were fighting to maintain control over the SDV in
RS. The latter became increasingly disunited; it was still legally
connected to the federal bodies, but was becoming aware of the
fact that it operated and worked in Slovenia. Some professional
cadres, especially those in the “domestic field” (dealing with the
“bourgeois rightwing”, clericalists, and student movements),
began leaving the service. Conflict was increasing, and SDV
archives were being systematically destroyed. In its search for new
roles, the RS SDV also began to limit information it was sending
to the ZSDV. It ultimately restricted its information to foreign intel-
ligence services.
Along with the weakening positions of the The ZSDV position
was becoming weaker and attempts by the JLA (Yugoslav People’s
Army) Security Service to strengthen its position in Slovenia and in
the Slovene SDV were becoming more numerous. The attempts
failed because they depended upon cadres of other nationalities
still employed at the RS SDV but who had no access to data bases
and had no decision-making power due to their »Yugoslav« orien-
tation.
In order to save what could be saved, the federal secretary of
internal affairs issued an act which mandated federal bodies to
perform an inspection in the RS SDV from 25 February-1 March
1991 with the goal of determining the reasons for the failure of
ZSNZ SDV to accomplish a unified surveillance of subjects. Other
questions to be answered addressed were: harmonization of fed-
eral interests in the Republic of Slovenia with Slovenian interests;
decrease in information intelligence from the Republic of
Slovenia; and decrease in quality, substance, and clarity of infor-
mation. In short, the objective was, as explained by the federal
secretary of internal affairs «to bring Slovenia its senses”. The sec-
retary of internal affairs announced this inspection in a letter of 11
February 1991. Slovenia immediately rejected the move. The RS
secretary of internal affairs informed the federal bodies that
Slovenia was refusing the inspection because »such an inspection
violates current legislation« and reminding them that a plebiscite76
in Slovenia on 23 Dec. 1990, voted for an independent and sov-
ereign republic in which constitutional amendments regulating this
area had been adopted. Since the law placing domestic affairs
under the control of the federal administrative bodies was no
longer in force, the inspection was therefore impossible. The reply
represented a complete break in relations with the ZSDV.
Establishment of VIS
Under these conditions, regulation of security intelligence and the
role of the RS SDV had to be resolved. Even though the Slovene
democratic authorities rejected the »lustration legislation« which
had been adopted by other former communist bloc countries, its
decisions to disempower the SDV, force administrative retirements,
legislative changes, reorganization and a reformulation of the
work program, leadership cadre reshuffles and, last but not least,
a renaming of the Security Intelligence Service (VIS) created con-
ditions in which the service was no longer a threat, but still capa-
ble of confronting the increasingly aggressive JLA.
The VIS was legally regulated in 1991 by the Act on Changes
and Supplements to the Act on Internal Affairs, though it had been
adopted in 1980 and twice amended (1988 and 1989). It was
organized as a RSNZ service responsible for proposing measures
addressing dangers to the security and existence of the country.
The work of the VIS included tracking, recording, and analyzing
information on activities of foreign countries, their intelligence
services and other organizations, including terrorist, believed
capable of posing threat to defense, security, political, or eco-
nomic interests of the country. It was organized regionally and
empowered to use special operative methods (covert co-opera-
tion and surveillance, purchase of objects, interception of tele-
phone and other communications and media, interception of let-
ters and other consignments, anti-interception inspection, and
technical protection of facilities), but it was forced to relinquish
classic police powers, thereby shedding its label as the VIS »polit-
ical police«. Immediately after it was established, the VIS found
itself in a difficult position, for the JLA, federal police, and customs
authorities began their aggression against Slovenia15.
The VIS immediately focussed on information collection, and
discovering the intentions, goals, and activities of the JLA and
other federal bodies opposing  independence. Within its limits, it
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15. Since the SFRY Presidency, as the supreme commander of the armed forces, no
longer functioned unanimously, the Federal Executive Council (in other words, the
federal government) passed the resolution that the federal police and customs
would install federal police control and close the international border crossings
between Slovenia and its neighbors (Italy, Austria, Hungary). The JLA was supposed,
according to the resolution by the Federal Executive Council, to assist federal police
and customs bodies.
also thwarted JLA activities. For the first time, the VIS disseminat-
ed information (through foreign TV and radio stations) and assist-
ed in spreading the truth about events in Yugoslavia and Slovenia.
Even though the VIS was professional and efficient, before
and during the aggression on Slovenia, later events brought it to
near collapse and retarded the further development of the intelli-
gence security system. However, as soon as the last soldier of the
Yugoslav Army left Slovene soil, the first voices of dissent emerged
between the intelligence security service of Defense Ministry
(VOMO) and the VIS, which grew into open conflict in the follow-
ing years. The reputation of the intelligence security service was
called into question, and reached its lowest point between 1994-
9616. The reasons for this development were numerous, among
them: 
1. After the departure of the aggressor JLA from Slovenia, the
»value« of intelligence security information decreased; what
prevailed was glorification of the victory, the concept of an all-
consuming friendship with the Western world, and the super-
fluity of intelligence work.
2. The foundations for the intelligence security system had not
been laid and the criteria for national security had not been
agreed upon. Intelligence security information was being col-
lected by different services with diverse authorizations and
powers.
3. The norms were devised based on short-term concepts, and
failed to address the differences between the new and the
former single party system17.
4. Intelligence security bodies (various services) were dispersed
throughout different ministries and subordinated to superiors
from different political representing different political interests.
5. Due to earlier criticisms of SDV (i.e., uncritical simplification
and failure to distinguish between »internal, counter-
intelligence, and intelligence«) the public refused support to
new services and reduced their efficiency, as they were unable
to acquire new agents.
6. Growing requests for the absolute disclosure to the public
made obsolete the concept of »SECRET« which was still not
defined under the new legal conditions. Services’ files were
removed, agents’ personal files were made public, and con-
troversial documents and archive materials were misused or
removed. 
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16. Events which indirectly contributed to a devaluation of intelligence-security work
were the circumstances surrounding the affair »Depala vas«, suspicions about the
illegal sale of weapons, international contacts and the »Israeli agreement”, »SAVA
affair«, »Zavrè affair«, cases of »unlawful interception of foreign diplomatic repre-
sentative offices, etc.
17. A Vision and Strategy of Development of the security intelligence service was oth-
erwise elaborated and approved by the Government, but was »left in the drawer«
and never completed or realized.
7. Intelligence security services were not under unified parliamen-
tary control until 1993. The control itself was not exercised in
practice, which resulted in frequent deviations18.
These factors politicized the intelligence security activity to
such extent that the word »UDBA«19 became a synonym for evil
and repugnance, and the term »UDBOVEC« an insult which was
legally sanctioned. Under these circumstances, it was the opinion
of foreign intelligence services that Slovene intelligence was disin-
tegrating and unable to accomplish its mission, and that »Slovenia
has become a free training ground for the safe activities of foreign
intelligence services«.
Establishment of SOVA
To prevent further decline of the services, the Government of the
Republic of Slovenia adopted measures to end stagnation and to
further consolidate. One was the decision to remove the VIS from
the Interior Ministry and transform it into a service of the
Government of the Republic of Slovenia. Unfortunately, this meas-
ure was not fully implemented. The VIS, which was renamed the
Slovene Intelligence Security Service (SOVA) did not become an
autonomous service of the government of the Republic of
Slovenia, but was given a supervising body composed of three
ministers who were to monitor the rights, duties, and authoriza-
tions of the Service’s Director and provide him with guidelines.
Unfortunately, the commission was formed on a political basis,
without considering the needs of trade-craft. Even though the
measure did not entirely regulate the intelligence and security field
(some tasks were still being performed at the Defense Ministry), it
represented a major improvement.
The next positive step was the adoption of the Resolution on
Starting Points of a RS National Security Scheme (1993) which
defined “intelligence security activity” as an instrument to provide
the competent bodies with important information and analytical
and operative assessments needed for making decisions about the
security of the Republic of Slovenia. The resolution also mandat-
ed the State Assembly (the parliament) to formulate strategic
guidelines, direct the work of intelligence security services and
exercise parliamentary control, whereas the Government of the
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18. For instance, the commission controlling of the legality of SDV’s work and later that
of the VIS did not detect any irregularities in the work for many years in a row and
then, in 1992, it suddenly discovered that the VIS was not working in 1991 accord-
ing to the law and the constitution (»interception affair«). The state assembly, how-
ever, confirmed in June 1993 the legitimacy of VIS work during the period inde-
pendence was being attained.
19. UDBA is an acronym which stands for »State Security Directorate« - a Serb term for
the SDV.
Republic of Slovenia was to set priorities and direct and co-
ordinate the work of the Services.
In order to regulate the intelligence and security in the
Republic of Slovenia, the Slovene government prepared a draft on
the law on intelligence security activity (1994). However, it failed
to win support of the parliament. Attempts to regulate the intelli-
gence security continued until 1999, when the State Assembly
adopted the Act on Slovene Intelligence and Security Agencies.
The Act on Slovene and Intelligence Security Agencies
(ZSOVA) defines SOVA is an independent governmental service
which collects, evaluates, and provides users with information to
safeguard security, political, and economic interests of the coun-
try20, as well as information on organizations, groups, and persons
who, through activities abroad or in connection with foreign enti-
ties, constitute a threat to national security and the constitutional
order; it also deals with security clearances. SOVA collects infor-
mation covertly and also utilizes special forms of information col-
lection such as monitoring international communications systems,
covert purchase of documents and objects, and overt observation
and surveillance in open or public places by technical means.  In
exceptional cases, SOVA may collect information through inter-
ception of letters and other means of communication, including
telecommunications, if authorized by the competent District Court.
The latter can authorize the above measures in order to: combat
covert activities against the sovereignty of the Republic of
Slovenia, uncover operations of international terrorist organiza-
tions, in cases of disclosure of classified information, if prepara-
tions for armed aggression against the Republic of Slovenia are
underway; and to expose intelligence activities of individuals,
organizations and groups, and international organized crime.
SOVA is today a modern, professional, and efficient organi-
zation, comparable to other intelligence security services around
the world. It is capable of dealing with more sophisticated securi-
ty challenges and actively cooperates with other intelligence secu-
rity services in the world as an equal partner.
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20. SOVA does not collect and evaluate information of a defense nature, because this
is the prerogative of the intelligence security service of the Defense Ministry.
